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NOTE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE-
GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION:
NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE SUPPRESSION
OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE-
ARIZONA V EVANS, 115 S. CT. 1185 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 1, 1995, the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Evans' extended the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule to preclude the suppression of evidence obtained
during an arrest in which the arresting officer had reasonably relied on
a computer record that was subsequently found to be erroneous as a
result of judicial error.2 Critics of the Court's position have argued that
the continued limitation of the exclusionary rule will eventually result in
the admission of evidence based on warrantless searches?
This Note provides a synopsis of the facts and procedural holdings of
Evans and the earlier precedent on which the Court based its decision.
An evaluation of the Court's joint, concurring, and dissenting opinions
follows. Lastly, the wisdom of the Court's opinion, the holding's future
implications, and the merits of its criticism will be considered.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), rev'g 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994).
2. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule "commands that where evidence has been
obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution, the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990). The ."good faith exception' to [the]
exclusionary rule provides that evidence is not to be suppressed under such rule where that
evidence was discovered by officers acting in good faith and in reasonable, though mistaken,
belief that they were authorized to take those actions." Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984)).
3. See Note, Exclusionary Rule-Good-Faith Exception, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 108
(1984).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In January 1991, Isaac Evans was observed by a police officer driving
his automobile the wrong way on a one-way street in front of the
Phoenix police station.4 The officer stopped Evans and requested that
Evans produce his driver's license.5 Evans indicated to the officer that
his driver's license had been suspended.6 Upon being notified of Evans'
suspension, the police officer entered Evans' name into a computer
terminal located in his patrol car.7 The inquiry confirmed that Evans'
license had been suspended and also indicated that he had an outstand-
ing misdemeanor warrant for his arrest.8 Based on the apparent
outstanding warrant, Evans was arrested.9
While being handcuffed by the officer, a rolled cigarette dropped
from Evans' person, which the officer determined smelled of marijua-
na.'" A subsequent search of Evans' vehicle revealed a bag of marijua-
na under the front passenger's seat." On the basis of this evidence,
Evans was charged with possession of marijuana."
Following Evans' arrest, it was discovered that the computer records
used by the arresting officer were erroneous because the arrest warrant
had been quashed prior to the January arrest. 13  Evans moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the arrest, arguing that the evidence
was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest and that the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable because police error,
not judicial error, caused the unlawful arrest. 4
At the suppression hearing, the trial court applied the exclusionary
rule and suppressed the evidence, reasoning that police personnel were
4. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. I1&
11. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 870 (Ariz. 1994).
12. Id.
13. Id. At the suppression hearing, conflicting evidence was presented on whether the
computerized mistake had been made on the part of law enforcement personnel or court
employees. Id. The trial judge did not reconcile this issue and apparently concluded that any
distinction was insignificant. Id.
14. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1188 (1995).
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negligent in maintaining computer records."5 The Arizona Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the evidence should not
have been suppressed because the mistake probably was made by court
employees rather than law enforcement personnel.16 Furthermore, the
court found that the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police
misconduct would not be served by suppressing the evidence because
court employees, the group in error according to the court's analysis,
were not directly associated with the arresting officers. 7 The Arizona
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding the distinction
drawn by the court of appeals between court employees and law
enforcement unpersuasive. 18 The court also found that application of
the exclusionary rule would improve the efficiency of the criminal record
keeping system and, thus, be consistent with the exclusionary rule's
deterrence purpose. 19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the exclusionary rule required the suppression of evidence
obtained incident to an arrest resulting from an inaccurate computer
record, regardless of whether police or court personnel were at fault for
the record's inaccuracy.2' The Court held that the exclusionary rule
does not require the suppression of evidence seized during an arrest
resulting from a computer record that was erroneous as a result of court
employee error.2
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Evans was the first decision by the United States Supreme Court to
address whether application of the Fourth Amendment's good-faith
exception was appropriate when an arresting officer had acted in
15. Evans, 866 P.2d at 870. The trial court relied on State v. Greene, 783 P.2d 829 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1989), "which applied the exclusionary rule where police personnel were negligent
in maintaining computer records." Evans, 866 P.2d at 870. However, the trial court, in apply-
ing this rule, failed to clarify who made the mistake, police employees or court employees.
lId Perhaps if the trial court had clarified this issue, Evans would not have percolated to the
United States Supreme Court, but been resolved through state law.
16. Id. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's application of State v. Green
because of its determination that court employees rather than police employees were
responsible for the computer error. Id.
17. Ia at 870-71. In asserting its position, the court of appeals relied on Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Id. at 870-71.
18. Id. at 871-72.
19. Id. at 872.
20. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1189 (1995).
21. Id. at 1188.
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objectively reasonable reliance on a computer record later found to be
inaccurate because of court employee error. However, the basis of the
Evans decision has been established in Court precedent.
In United States v. Peltier,22 the United States Supreme Court held
that evidence seized from a search conducted pursuant to a statute later
declared unconstitutional would not be excluded at trial if the police had
a reasonable, good faith belief that the evidence would be admissible.'
However, the Court did not articulate whether, in a judicial application
of the good-faith exception, the reasonableness of a police officer's belief
would be based on the subjective knowledge of the officer or an
objective measure.24 In the cases of United States v. Leon' and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard,26 the United States Supreme Court clarified
this issue by modifying the exclusionary rule through adoption of an
objective, good-faith exception that allows illegally obtained evidence to
be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief against a defendant.
In United States v. Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied to evidence seized by a police officer whose
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was
objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was later found
defective.27 On the basis of three factors, the Court concluded that
application of the exclusionary rule would not serve the rule's deterrent
purpose. 8
22. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
23. See id. at 535-42.
24. Id. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
27. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913. The police officers in Leon primarily based their search
warrant requests on an anonymous informant of unproven reliability. A magistrate found
probable cause and issued the requested search warrants. The ensuing searches discovered
quantities of illegal drugs. The defendants in Leon moved to suppress the evidence, and the
district court partially granted the suppression, finding that the warrant was issued on less than
probable cause. Id. at 901-05.
28. The Court explained the deterrent purpose and rationale of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule as follows:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their
future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where
the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force.
Ia at 919 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)); see also United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975).
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First, the Court determined that the historical purpose of the
exclusionary rule was "to deter police misconduct rather than to punish
the errors of judges and magistrates."' 9 Second, the Court found no
persuasive evidence suggesting that judicial officers were inclined to
ignore or subvert the commands of the Fourth Amendment." Third,
and most important to the Leon court, there was no basis for believing
that the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have
a significant deterrent effect on the arresting officer(s) or the issuing
magistrate.31 In sum, the Leon majority found that "[p]enalizing the
officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, [could] not
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions."3
The Leon Court also set forth parameters limiting the application of
its holding by recognizing specific instances in which reasonable reliance
would not exist. These instances included: (1) when the magistrate had
abandoned his detached and neutral role in reviewing search warrant
applications; (2) when the executing officer knew or should have known
that the information provided to the magistrate was false; (3) when the
affidavit was so lacking an indicia of probable cause that an officer's
reliance on the warrant would be unreasonable; and (4) when the
warrant was so facially deficient in its particularization of the places to
be searched or the items to be seized that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.33
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan attacked the majority's
29. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. The Court specifically noted that the error in Leon which
precipitated the Fourth Amendment violation was made by the magistrate issuing the search
warrant without the requisite probable cause. Id. at 921. Further, the Court stated: "In the
ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause
determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. 'Once the
warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with
the law."' Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id at 916.
31. Id. The Court stated, and has referred to its statement in subsequent cases, that
"[j]udges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial offi-
cers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of
exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them." Id. at 917. The Court found
that the more effective remedy for magistrates who had neglected their duty in issuing
warrants was removal. Id. at 916 n.18.
32. Id. at 921.
33. Idt at 923. The Court did not specifically enumerate elements which it considered
demonstrative of a magistrate's disregard of a "neutral and detached function," but generally
characterized the situation as where the magistrate had abandoned his role or taken on an
investigative posture in issuing a warrant; as the Court referred to it-a "rubber stamp" or "an
adjunct law enforcement officer." Id at 914 (citations omitted).
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characterization of the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy,
rather than a personal constitutional right.34 In disagreeing with the
majority's characterization, Brennan first noted that the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment restrain the power of the government as a whole
rather than a particular agency." Next, Brennan noted that the
admission of illegally obtained evidence logically implicated the same
constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of the evidence "[b]ecause
seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such
evidence generally has utility ... only in the context of a trial ....
Using these propositions as a basis, Brennan posited that the only
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that would give effect to its
limitations was one that read the Fourth Amendment "to condemn not
only the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy-which is done, after
all, for the purpose of securing evidence-but also the subsequent use of
any evidence."37 Furthermore, Brennan supported his position by citing
an earlier case of the United States Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio,8 in
which the Court held that, pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the states were forbidden from admitting evidence
obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures.39 Implicit in Mapp's
holding, Brennan explained, was that exclusion of evidence obtained
from an unreasonable search or seizure was a constitutional privilege
and, thus, the exclusionary rule was "part and parcel of the Fourth
Amendment's limitation upon [governmental] encroachment of
individual privacy. ' As discussed below, the dissenting opinions in
Arizona v. Evans set forth arguments similar to those advanced by
Justice Brennan in Leon.
In Massachusetts v. Sheppard,4 decided the same day as United
States v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusion-
ary rule did not require the suppression of evidence seized by police
officers who had reasonably relied on a warrant that was later found
technically defective.4  Applying the rules articulated in Leon, the
34. Id. at 931 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Justice Marshall.
35. Id. at 932.
36. Id. at 933.
37. Id. at 934.
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39. See iL at 655-58.
40. Leon, 468 U.S. at 940 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
651 (1961)).
41. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
42. IL at 987-88. In Sheppard, the police sought a warrant authorizing a search of the
defendant's residence. In support of their request, the police prepared an affidavit that
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Court found that the only issue to be determined was whether the police
officers had acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the subject
warrant.43 Relying on the fact that the issuing magistrate failed to
make all the necessary clerical corrections to the subject warrant after
assuring the officers that he would, the Sheppard court held that the
officers had acted in an objectively reasonable manner.' Furthermore,
the Court held that the exclusionary rule's deterrent function would not
be served because it was the judge's failure to make the necessary
corrections, not the officers' action, that caused the Fourth Amendment
violation.45
The next decision addressing the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule was Illinois v. Krull. 6 . In Krull, the United States
Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to preclude the
suppression of evidence obtained by police officers who had reasonably
relied upon a statute authorizing a warrantless search, even though the
statute was later found to be unconstitutional.47 The Court concluded
that suppressing the evidence would have little deterrent effect in
changing the officer's conduct since it was the legislature, not the officer,
that had committed the unconstitutional violation.'
Similar to the Supreme Court's analysis of magistrates in Leon, the
Krull Court examined whether application of the exclusionary rule would
included a detailed account of the items for which they planned to search. Unfortunately, the
officers were unable to find the correct search warrant form and instead used a form for drug
searches. The officers made changes to the form; however, complete reference to controlled
substances was not deleted from the form. The officer explained to the magistrate the problem
in the form, upon which the magistrate assured the officer that he would make the appropriate
changes and issued the warrant. The magistrate, however, failed to make the appropriate
changes to the warrant. Id. at 984-86.
43. Id at 988.
44. Id at 989.
45. Id. at 991.
46. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). Krull owned and operated an automobile wrecking yard located
in the city of Chicago. Pursuant to an Illinois statute, a person dealing in automobiles, auto
parts, and auto scrap was required to have a license, keep records identifying automobiles and
parts in its inventory, and be subject to an examination of the premises, at any reasonable time
during the day or night, to determine the accuracy of the records. An examination of Krull's
yard uncovered a number of vehicles that were listed as stolen. These vehicles were im-
pounded and Krull was arrested and charged under the Illinois statute. The statute was
deemed unconstitutional the day after Krull's arrest. Id. at 340-45.
47. Id. at 349-50.
48. Id. at 350. The Court further explained: "If the statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to it prior to such judicial declaration
will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled his
responsibility to enforce the statute as written." Id.
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have a significant deterrent effect on legislatures. 9  Reiterating the
three factors set forth in Leon, the Court determined that application of
the exclusionary rule would have little deterrent effect on legislative
misconduct."0 First, the Court recognized that the exclusionary rule was
designed to apply to police misconduct and not legislative misconduct.51
Second, the Court determined that there was no persuasive evidence
indicating that a legislature would ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment or the Constitution.5' To the contrary, the Court noted
that "courts presume that legislatures act in a constitutional manner."53
Third, the Court determined that application of the exclusionary rule
would have little additional deterrent effect considering the more
immediate deterrent mechanism of judicial invalidation of unconstitution-
al statutes.5"
Again, similar to the Court's decision in Leon, the Krull Court
qualified the application of its holding. The Krull Court recognized that
"[a] statute cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if... the
legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional
laws."55 Further, the Court recognized that an officer could not have
acted in good-faith reliance on a statute if a "reasonable officer should
have known that the statute was unconstitutional."56
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's
application of Leon, but disagreed with its result.57 Justice O'Connor
found that the historical basis for the Fourth Amendment was to protect
against statutes authorizing unreasonable searches58 and that the
49. See id. at 350-53.
50. Id.
51. Ia at 350. The Krull court stated: "Thus, legislatures, like judicial officers, are not
the focus of the rule." id.
52. Id. at 351.
53. Id (citing McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802.808-09
(1969)).
54. Id. at 350-52. Explaining its determination, the court stated: "Invalidating a statute
informs the legislature of its constitutional error, affects the admissibility of all evidence
obtained subsequent to the constitutional ruling, and often results in the legislature's enacting
a modified and constitutional version of the statute ...." Id. at 352.
55. Id. at 355. The Court's position is similar to that taken by the Court in Leon, where
it observed that an officer cannot be found to have acted in reasonable reliance when evidence
demonstrated that the issuing magistrate had abandoned his role as a detached and neutral
administrator. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355.
57. Id. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
58. Id.
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exclusionary rule had been applied consistently to suppress evidence
obtained pursuant to such unconstitutional statutes. 9 Additionally,
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's conclusion that legislatures
were not adjuncts to law enforcement, arguing that "[t]he legislature's
objective in passing a law authorizing unreasonable searches.., is
explicitly to facilitate law enforcement."'  Lastly, Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the Court that application of the exclusionary rule would
not have a deterrent effect on legislative misconduct.6' Instead, Justice
O'Connor argued that application of the rule would provide incentive for
legislatures to promulgate constitutional laws by closing the grace period
during which police could conduct otherwise unconstitutional searches in
order to convict those who might otherwise escape prosecution.
6 2
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CASE
A. The Joint Opinion
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,6' the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court and held
that the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment did not require the
suppression of evidence obtained by an officer who acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on a computer record that was later found to be
erroneous as a result of judicial error.'
Initially, the Court reiterated its established interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, observing that "the Fourth Amendment contains no
59. Id. at 363 (citations omitted).
60. Id at 365.
61. Id at 366.
62. Id Justice O'Connor explained that the police are in effect given a grace period
under Leon to collect and use illegally obtained evidence. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
However, the majority addressed this concern by limiting its holding by noting that objectively
reasonable reliance would not exist when a "reasonable officer should have known that the
statute was unconstitutional." Id. at 355; see also supra notes 33 and 55 and accompanying
text.
63. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, and Breyer.
64. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995). It is important to note that in drafting the
question for review the Court considered whether the source of the error, police or clerical
personnel, would affect its determination in applying the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1189. In
its final holding, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule would not be applied to instances
where the underlying computerized error was the result of court employees' conduct. Id. at
1194. Implicit in the Court's holding is the position that computerized errors chargeable to
police conduct would warrant application of the exclusionary rule, thereby suppressing
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation
of its commands"6 and that "[t]he exclusionary rule operates as a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations
of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent
effect."'  Further, the Court restated its position that the wrong
condemned by the Fourth Amendment is suffered in the initial search
and seizure, and the subsequent use of illegally obtained evidence works
no new Fourth Amendment violation.67 Thus, the Court concluded that
application of the exclusionary rule was an issue separate from the issue
of whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.6
In examining whether application of the exclusionary rule was
appropriate, the Court noted that "[w]here 'the exclusionary rule does
not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use.., is unwar-
ranted.' 69 Applying the analysis set forth in Leon, the Court examined
whether application of the exclusionary rule would significantly deter
future errors by court employees. Adhering to the analysis in its
holdings of Leon and Krull, the Court concluded that: (1) historically,
the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct, not court
65. lI at 1191.
66. ld.; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. A preliminary issue faced by the
Court was whether it had jurisdiction to review Evans. The Court first examined whether the
Arizona Supreme Court's decision was based on an "adequate and independent state ground,"
thereby foreclosing its review. Id. at 1189. Recognizing that the Arizona Supreme Court had
referred to federal law in reversing the lower appellate court and had not offered a plain
statement that its reference to federal law was solely for purposes of guidance and not
compelling its decision, the Court concluded that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision "was
based squarely upon its interpretation of federal law." Id. at 1190. Noting the need to protect
against the lack of clarity in state court decisions interpreting the United States Constitution,
the Court asserted jurisdiction as the final arbiter of the United States Constitution. Id. (citing
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940)). Justice Ginsburg attacked the Court's
position in her dissent. See infra note 95 accompanying text.
67. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974))). The basis of the Court's
conclusion is found in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), rev'd, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In
Wolf, the United States Supreme Court explicitly treated the question of whether to exclude
illegally obtained evidence as a matter of remedies, separate from the question of whether a
Fourth Amendment invasion had occurred. Id. at 28. The Wolf Court stated: "Accordingly,
we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order." Id.; see also
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1378 (1983).
68. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191 (citations omitted).
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
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employee misconduct;70 (2) no evidence had been offered to demon-
strate that court employees had the inclination to ignore or subvert the
commands of the Fourth Amendment;7 and (3) there was no basis for
believing that application of the exclusionary rule would deter court
employees from failing to inform police officials of quashed warrants
considering that court personnel had no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions.72
Additionally, the Court examined whether application of the
exclusionary rule would have a significant deterrent effect on police
misconduct.7 3 The Court concluded that application of the rule would
not have a significant deterrent effect since the appearance of computer-
ized errors was minimal.74 Moreover, there was no evidence that the
arresting officer did not act in an objectively reasonable manner when
he relied on the computer record.75
B. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority's opinion, but
questioned whether the majority had unwisely limited itself in concluding
that the only error committed in the case was that by the court
employee.7 6 Justice O'Connor posited that "[w]hile the police were
innocent of the court employee's mistake, they may or may not have
acted reasonably in their reliance on the recordkeeping system itself" 77
In concluding, Justice O'Connor asserted that law enforcement could not
be said to have reasonably relied on a recordkeeping system when the
70. Id. at 1193 (citations omitted).
71. lit The Court noted that "the Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified at the
suppression hearing that this type of error occurred once every three or four years." Id.
(citing App. 37).
72. Id (citations omitted). The Court found that court employees could not have a stake
in a particular criminal prosecution because they were not considered "adjuncts to the law
enforcement team." Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
73. Id. at 1193.
74. Id at 1193-94. The Court relied on testimony that the type of error involved in
Evans only occurred once every three or four years. Id. Justice Stevens attacked this reliance
in his dissent and noted that the clerk had stated in her testimony that similar erroneous
outstanding warrants existed when records were checked after the Evans incident. See id at
1196 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1193. The Court quoted the trial court's statement that the officer was bound
to arrest Evans under the circumstances and would have been considered derelict in his duty
if he had failed to do so. Id.
76. Id at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor's concurrence was joined by
Justices Souter and Breyer.
77. Id
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system had no mechanism for checking the accuracy of records."
C. Justice Souter's Opinion
In a relatively short opinion, Justice Souter concurred with the
majority's opinion, but questioned the extent to which the concept of
deterrence would be applied beyond the police to reach the government
as a whole in dealing with the fruits of computerized error.79
D. Justice Stevens' Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority
opinion's characterization of the exclusionary rule's purpose as deterring
solely police misconduct." Under Stevens' rationale, the Fourth
Amendment "is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely
some of its agents."81 Thus, under Stevens' reasoning, application of
the Fourth Amendment in Evans applied to the conduct of court
employees and not specifically law enforcement.' Additionally, Justice
Stevens disagreed with the Court's characterization of the exclusionary
rule as an "extreme sanction."83  Instead, Stevens characterized the
exclusionary rule's sanction as merely placing the Government in the
same position as if the illegal search and seizure had not occurred.8'
Further, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's reliance on United
States v. Leon. Noting that the central focus of the Court's reasoning in
Leon was the existence of a presumptively valid warrant and that Evans
involved an arrest when no warrant was outstanding, Justice Stevens
concluded that application of Leon's reasoning was misplaced in the
context of what he viewed as a warrantless search.85
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority's position that law
78. Id. Justice O'Connor compared the standard of reasonable reliance she believed was
appropriate to the level of scrutiny required when finding probable cause on the basis of
information obtained from an informant. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
79. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Breyer joined in Justice
Souter's concurrence.
80. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasized that the Fourth Amendment
protected against all official searches and seizures that were unreasonable and, therefore,
constrained the power of the sovereign as a whole. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
83. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1196.
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enforcement could not be held accountable for the computerized
error.86 Stevens argued that the reasonable presumption, under the
circumstances of Evans, would be to allocate responsibility for the error
to the police "who stand in the best position to monitor such errors" and
"can influence mundane communication procedures in order to prevent
those errors. '  Further, Stevens posited that his presumption "com-
ports with the notion that the exclusionary rule exists to deter future
police misconduct systematically."88
Lastly, Justice Stevens argued that the majority of the Court had
failed to minimize the impact of its decision on the security of citizens.89
Stevens argued that the majority overlooked the reality of computer
technology's growing infringement on citizen's privacy and, thus, opened
"wholly innocent citizens [to] unwarranted indignity. 9
E. Justice Ginsburg's Opinion
Justice Ginsburg's dissent initially noted the significant amplification
that computerization has on the effect of an error.91 Considering the
widespread use of national criminal databases, Ginsburg asserted that a
corresponding need for prompt correction of data was vital.92 With
these concerns as a basis, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's
compartmentalization of governmental actors, characterizing it as
"artificial."'93 Instead, Ginsburg reasoned that court and police person-
nel jointly carry out the state's information-gathering objectives.94
Thus, Justice Ginsburg posited that application of the exclusionary rule
would supply the necessary incentive for states to promote the prompt
updating of computerized records, thereby inhibiting the incident of
Fourth Amendment violations.95
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 1d.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1197.
91. Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined Justice Ginsburg's
dissent.
92. Id. at 1194.
93. Id. at 1200.
94. 1i
95. Id. Justice Ginsburg also disagreed with the majority's assertion of jurisdiction based
on the presumption announced in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), that absent a plain
statement of intent to rest upon an independent state ground, a state court's decision is pre-
sumed to be based on federal law. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Under
Ginsburg's reasoning, Long should have been overruled and an opposite presumption should
have been applied so that "the States' ability to serve as laboratories for testing solutions to
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
Arizona v. Evans was correctly decided. The holding clearly follows
precedent of the Court and, despite opinions to the contrary, is not an
authorization for the use of evidence based on warrantless searches.
Nevertheless, portions of the joint opinion's analysis fail to provide the
parameters set forth in earlier decisions of the Court, reducing the
decision's persuasiveness. Furthermore, the dissenting opinions in Evans
pose fundamental questions regarding the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the source of the exclusionary rule, thereby deteriorating the
persuasiveness of the majority's position and the propriety of the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
A. Analysis of the Joint Opinion
Initially, the Court disagreed with the Arizona Supreme Court's
rejection of the distinction between court employees and police
employees.96 However, the Court neither provided an explanation for
its disagreement nor support for its rationale. The Court in Leon and
Krull clearly defined the differing roles of the police, the judiciary, and
the legislature in support of the distinctions it was advocating.97 Thus,
the Evans Court lost potential credibility for its position by not strictly
following its prior analysis.
The Evans Court also broke from its prior analysis in Leon and Krull
by not limiting the application of its holding by defining instances in
which reasonable reliance would not exist.98 This may cause problems
for the Court in the future.99 The Court did, however, limit its holding
novel legal problems" would not be impeded. Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 1193.
97. For example, in both Leon and Krull, the Court described the police officer's role
as one "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1983) (citations omitted); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987)
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). In Leon, the Court distinguished
magistrates from the police by defining the judicial role as a "neutral and detached"
administrator reviewing warrant applications. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914. In Krull, the Court
defined the purpose of legislators as enacting laws for the continued establishment and
perpetuation of the criminal justice system. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 351. Further, the Court
noted that this role was different than law enforcement in that it involved a greater delibera-
tion before action. Id.
98. See supra Part III.
99. A potential parameter the Court could have articulated was expressed by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion: namely, law enforcement would not be deemed to have
acted in objectively reasonable reliance when the record-keeping system they were relying on
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by narrowing the sources of computer errors covered by the good-faith
exception to those committed by court employees."° Implicit in this
limitation is the proposition that computer errors caused by police
employees would warrant application of the exclusionary rule.
Recently, in State v. White,'0' the Florida Supreme Court reviewed
whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized
incident to an arrest resulting from an inaccurate computer record, later
found to be erroneous because of police error. 2 The Florida Supreme
Court held that an arresting police officer was properly chargeable with
the knowledge of an inaccurate computer record through the "fellow
officer" or "collective knowledge" rule which provides that, when making
an arrest, an officer may rely upon information supplied by fellow
officers; however, if the information fails to support the arrest, fruits of
the arrest are not insulated from challenges that the arresting officer
relied on information furnished by fellow officers.'0° Because the
arresting officer in White was chargeable with knowledge of the
inaccurate computer record, the Florida Supreme Court found that the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable and
suppression of the illegally seized evidence was appropriate. 14
The strongest portion of the joint opinion in Evans was the Court's
evaluation of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose.
The Court adhered to the strict analysis of its prior holdings and applied
the three basic factors articulated in Leon and Krull." Further, the
Court supported its conclusion that application of the exclusionary rule
would have a minimal deterrent effect on court employees by noting that
"once the court clerks discovered the error, they immediately corrected
had no mechanism for checking the accuracy of records. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185,
1194 (1995) (O,Connor, J., concurring).
100. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
101. 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1995).
102. Id at 665.
103. Id. at 667 (citing Whitely v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 5.60,568
(1971)). It should be noted that Evans relied on Whitely in arguing application of the exclu-
sionary rule. The Evans court found this reliance "dubious" in that the Whitely court treated
identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the
exclusionary rule to evidence seized incident to that violation. The Evans court noted that
subsequent cases, such as Leon, Sheppard, and Krull, had rejected this "reflexive" application
of the exclusionary rule; instead, emphasizing that the issue of exclusion is separate from the
issue of whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
Thus, it appears that the Florida Supreme Court's analysis in White is inconsistent with the
current position of the United States Supreme Court.
104. White, 660 So. 2d at 668.
105. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193; see also supra Part III.
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it, and then proceeded to search their files to make sure that no similar
mistakes had occurred." 1 6
B. Analysis of Dissenting Opinions
A key issue posed by the dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg concerned the appropriate scope of the Fourth Amendment;
namely, whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the government as
a whole or in particular law enforcement."° Justice Stevens argued
that the Fourth Amendment was intended to be a "constraint on the
power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents."" Given
the combined information-gathering role of court personnel and law
enforcement, Justice Ginsburg found the distinction between court
personnel and police officers to be artificial."t9 The dissenting opinions
do have merit. In Weeks v. United States,"0 regarded as the one of the
first cases by the United States Supreme Court to recognize the existence
of the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
effect of the Fourth Amendment was
to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the
exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and
restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law."'
Considering the breadth of governmental entities that could be
potentially construed within the language of this statement of the Weeks
Court, the Evans dissenters may have a point that could provide the
necessary basis for a change in the Court's position in the future.
Another issue raised by the Evans dissenters and Justice Brennan in
his dissenting opinion in Leon is the issue of whether the exclusionary
rule is a constitutional privilege or a judicially created remedy. Mapp v.
106. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg both attacked the Court's reliance on the testimony of the court employees and
argued that the numerous errors found by the court employees after the Evans error was
discovered were indicative of the potential Fourth Amendment violations lurking unnoticed,
and thus, reason to apply the exclusionary rule. See Il at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id.
at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 1195 (Souter, J., concurring); id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1201
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
111. Id. at 391-92.
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Ohio is the central case supporting the proposition that the exclusionary
rule can be considered a constitutional privilege.' In Mapp, the
United States Supreme Court held that the states were bound by the
commands of the Fourth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' Under the Mapp Court's reasoning, "[t]o hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoy-
ment.""
1 4
The problem with the Mapp characterization is that no provision of
the Fourth Amendment expressly provides for the exclusionary rule as
a constitutional remedy.115 Furthermore, since Mapp, the Court has
only referred to the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy."6
Hence, it is questionable whether the Court's position in Mapp was
essentially a constitutional maneuver aimed at producing the desired
result of binding the states by the commands of the Fourth Amendment
rather than the recognition of a constitutional privilege. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that a simple change in the Court's position
regarding the source of the exclusionary rule could have a significant
impact upon the viability of the good-faith exception.
Both dissenting opinions took the position that application of the
exclusionary rule was appropriate because of the significant number of
citizens that could be affected by invalid computer errors.'17 However,
the Court has noted in prior cases that in appraising whether application
of the exclusionary rule is appropriate, "the simple fact that many are
affected ... is not sufficient to tip the balance if the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations would not be advanced in any meaningful
way."" 8
112. See supra Part III.
113. 367 U.S. 643, 655-58 (1961).
114. 1d. at 656.
115. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906 (1983); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987); Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.
Ct. 1185 (1995).
117. Justice Stevens explained: "[The] most serious impact will be on the otherwise
innocent citizen who is stopped for a minor traffic infraction and is wrongfully arrested based
on erroneous information in a computer data base." Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1197 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg explained that "computerization greatly amplifies an error's
effect, and correspondingly intensifies the need for prompt correction." Id. at 1199 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
118. Krull, 480 U.S. at 353.
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Additionally, the dissenters categorized Evans as a case involving a
warrantless search." 9 Under the dissenters' rationale, Evans was a
warrantless search because at the time of the search a warrant was not,
in reality, in existence."2 The dissenters' rationale is misplaced in that
it takes an after-the-fact review of the situation and fails to recognize the
central focus of the Court's analysis in deciding whether the good-faith
exception is applicable. The Court's analysis, as advanced in Leon,
Krull, and Evans, is to examine the police officer's reliance from the
reasonable person standard. Under this standard, the officer's actions
are reviewed by examining the information then known to the officer or,
in the alternative, information the officer should have known, not facts
that arise later in litigation. By abandoning the central focus of the
Court's long-standing analysis, the dissenters place too high a burden on
law enforcement by making them responsible for information yet
unknown to them.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Arizona v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court took on the
arduous task of balancing the interests of individual liberty as articulated
in the Fourth Amendment with the interests of the Government in
maintaining its citizens' safety and pursuing the search for truth. In so
doing, the Court appropriately extended the good-faith exception to
include instances in which law enforcement officers had acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on computer records in making an arrest,
even though the records were later found erroneous because of judicial
error. Consequently, the Court took another significant step in warning
future criminal defendants that mere technical violations by the police
are no longer a viable means of escape when based on objectively
reasonable behavior. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinions in Arizona
v. Evans assert fundamental questions underlying the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and the source of the exclusionary rule which, if decided in
accordance with their positions, would dramatically affect the jurispru-
dence of the Fourth Amendment and the viability of the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.
STEVEN M. SZYMANSKI
119. See Evans, at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
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